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A NEW DEPARTURE.-
The confidence of provincials in the power of a State to protect
its residents in their dealings with foreign corporations doing busi-
ness within the State, by giving them prior right of satisfaction
out of the local assets of such foreign corporation when reduced to
insolvency, has received a rude shock from the recent decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States in the Embreeville case
(Blake v. McClung), promulgated on 12th December, last, after
thirteen months' consideration. By some it is declared to be an-
other step toward centralization; by others, a judicial phase of the
imperialistic tendency of 1898; and by yet others,. the total aboli-
tion of the reserved rights of States. Whether any or all of these
sententious phrases correctly characterize the decision, depends, of
course, upon the point of view and the power of vision. It may
be none of these things; but, certainly, it is a noteworthy case, and
will challenge professional attention because of the manifest expan-
sion of the Federal free-trade and the distinct denial of the pro-
tective power of the State hitherto popularly and professionally be-
lieved to exist and generally recognized by the Courts.
As stated by a dissenting Justice (Brewer), "the doctrine of
this opinion is that a State has no power to secure protection to
persons within its jurisdiction, citizens or non-citizens, in respect
to property also within its jurisdiction, because, forsooth, such pro-
tection may in some cases work to the disadvantage of one who is
not only a non-resident, but also not a citizen of the State ;" and
he adds: "It seems to me that tile practical working out of this
doctrine will be, not that the State may not discriminate in favor
of its own residents as against non-residents, but that the State
must discriminate in favor of non-residents and against its own
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residents." A case having such results deserves more than a pass-
ing notice:
A British mining and manufacturing corporation, called "The
Embreeville Company," in pursuance of general statutory invita-
tion and permission, purchased a large tract of land in Tennessee,
erected a large iron furnace, and entered upon the making of pig-
iron. It became insolvent, and a bill was filed in a Tennessee
Court to wind qp its affairs and dispose of its property in that State.
The creditors were of three classes: the British debenture holders,
who furnished the capital for the enterprise; Americans, resident
of Virginia and Ohio, who furnished fuel and handled the product;
and numerous residents of Tennessee who had furnished ore, com-
missary stores, labor and credit for its local operation. The claims
of the first class amounted to some $7ooooo, of the second class
to about $6o,ooo, and of the third class to $9oooo, while the entire
available assets in the State were less than $i5o,ooo.
There was earnest contention for preference for the debenture
holders under a trust deed, and for resident creditors under State
Statute, both of which were strenuously resisted by the Ohio and
Virginia creditors, whom we may hereafter call the "American
creditors." The ultimate decision by the Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee was, that local creditors were entitled to prior satisfaction
out of the local assets, and that the residue should be distributed
among all the other creditors, American and British, pro rata. The
American creditors, by writ of error, brought before the Supreme
Court of the United States the Tennessee statute giving this pref-
erence to local creditors, and impeached its validity as repugnant
to the Federal Constitution: (i), in denying to them as citizens of
Ohio and Virginia the privileges and immunities guaranteed by
Article IV, Section 2; (2), in abridging privileges and immunities
and denying equal protection of the laws, guaranteed by the XIVth
Amendment.
The Act in question was entitled, "An Act to declare the terms
on which foreign corporations, organized for mining and manufac-
turing purposes, may carry on their business, and purchase, hold
and convey real and personal property in this State." The clause
giving priority is as follows:
"Nevertheless, creditors who may be residents of this State shall
"have a priority in the distribution of assets or subjection of the
"same, or any part thereof, to the payment of debts over all simple-
"contract creditors, being resident of any other country or coun-
"tries."
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The American creditors at first objected that this statute was
repugnant to the Interstate Commerce Clause of the Federal Con-
stitution (Art. I, Sec. 8), but on reflection, entirely abandoned this
contention, and relied thereafter solely upon the two "privilege-and-
immunity clauses" above cited. To their contention the Tennes-
see Court responded, that it was competent for a State to protect
its own residents and to prescribe the terms and conditions upon
which foreign corporations should enter the State and transact
business therein; that all persons dealing with the corporation were
bound to take notice of the State statute prescribing these condi-
tions; and that the statute became a part of their contracts, and,
thus, in effect, these American creditors agreed that the residents
of the State should have priority of satisfaction out of the assets of
this foreign corporation. To substantiate this view there were
numerous decisions of the United States Supreme Court:
In Bank v. Earl (13 Pet. 519), that court had said: "A corpo-
ration can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the
sovereignty by which it is created. * * * It must dwell in
the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to other sove-
reignty;" and in Paul v. Virginia (8 Wal. I81), it had said of
such foreign corporations: "Having no absolute right of recog-
nition in other States, and depending for such recognition and the
enforcement of its contracts upon their assent, it follows as matter
of course, that such assent may be granted upon such terms and
conditions as those States may think proper to impose. They may
exclude the foreign corporation entirely; they may restrict its busi-
ness to particular localities; or they may exact such security for the
performance of their contracts with their citizens, as in their judg-
ment will best promote the public interests. The whole matter
rests in their discretion." To the same effect were Ducat v. Chica-
go (io Wall. 41o), Doyle v. Insurance Co. (94 U. S. 535), Cooper
Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson (I 13 U. S. 727), Noble v. Mitchell (164 U. S.
367), and numerous other concurring decisions.
The precedent, however, which was most closely followed, and
seemed to leave no room for doubt as to the power of the State to
make such condition, was Fritts v. Palmer (132 U. S. 282). Colo-
rado had by constitution and statute forbidden any foreign corpo-
ration, doing business in that State, "to mortgage, or pledge, or
otherwise encumber its real or personal property situate in the
State to the injury or exclusion of any citizens or corporations of
the State who are creditors of such foreign corporation ;" and had
declared such mortgage ineffectual "as against any citizen or corpo-
ration of the State until all its liabilities due to any person or corpo-
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ration in the State at the time of recording such mortgage had
been paid and extinguished."
Upon the validity of this statute the Supreme Court of the
United States remarked: "No question is made in this case, indeed
there can be no doubt, as to the validity of this constitutional and
statutory provision so far as, at least, they do not directly affect
foreign or other interstate commerce." Assuming this deliverance
of the Supreme Court of the United States to be a correct exposi-
tion of constitutional law, the Supreme Court of Tennessee, with-
out hesitation, declared the Tennessee statute, as the Supreme
Court of the United States had declared the Colorado statute of
same import, to be valid and constitutional.
It was considered reasonable, and just, and constitutional for
the State to endeavor to protect residents dealing with a foreign cor-
poration in its limits upon the faith of its visible property to the
amount of their just claims. It was believed, if there could be no
doubt as to the validity of the statute which gave residents of Colo-
rado a prior right of satisfaction of their simple-contract debts over
a mortgage debt created in another State, there could surely be no
constitutional objection to a Tennessee statute giving priority to
the claims of its residents over the simple-contract debts of non-
residents; and so the Supreme Court of Tennessee denied to the
Britons the priority which they claimed on account of their ante-
cedent legal trust title, and gave to the local creditors, some of
whom were citizens of other States and some British subjects resid-
ing in Tennessee, the preference provided by the local statute, solely
because they were "residents of the State."
These former views, however, were not approved by a majority
of the Supreme Court of the United States in this case; but the
statute was declared to be repugnant, not to the XIVth Amend-
ment, but to Article IV, Section 2, which declares that "the citizens
of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States." In reviewing its former decisions
upon this article of the Constitution, the court quotes from Conner
v. Elliott(i8 Howard 591), to the effect that privileges are not sus-
ceptible of abstract definition; from Paul v. Virginia (supra), to the
effect that this article inhibits discriminating legislation against
citizens of other States, and tends strongly to constitute the citizens
of the United States one people; from the Slaughter House cases
(16 Wall. 3o), to the effect that it forbids the States to impose
restrictions on the rights of citizens of other States within their
jurisdiction; and from Cole v. Cunningham (33 U. S. 107), to the
effect that a "general citizenship" was created thereby for the citi-
zens of all the States; and then concludes:
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"But the enjoyment of these rights is materially obstructed by
the statute in question, for that statute, by its necessary operation,
excludes citizens of other States from transacting business with that
corporation upon terms of equality with citizens of Tennessee. By
force of the statute alone, citizens of other States, if they contracted
at all with the British corporation, must have done so subject to
the onerous condition that if the corporation became insolvent its
assets in Tennessee should first be applied to meet its obligations
to residents of that State. * * * But clearly the State could
not in that mode secure exclusive privileges to its own citizens in
matters of business. * * * It is an established rule of equity
that when a corporation becomes insolvent, it is so far civilly dead
that its property may be administered as a trust-fund for the bene-
fit of its stockholders and creditors, of whatever State they may
be citizens. * * * These principles obtain, no doubt, in Ten-
nessee, and will be applied by its courts in all appropriate cases
between citizens of that State, without making any distinction be-
tween them; yet the courts of that State are forbidden by the stat-
ute in question to recognize the right in equity of citizens residing
in other Statis, to participate upon terms of equality with citizens
of Tennessee in the distribution of the assets of an insolvent foreign
corporation lawfully doing business in that State. We hold such
discrimination against citizens of other States to be repugnant to
the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the
United States, although, generally speaking, the State has the
power to prescribe the conditions upon which foreign corporations
may enter its territory for the purposes of business. Such a power
cannot be exerted with the effect of defeating or impairing rights
secured to citizens of the several States by the supreme law of the
land."
The determined resolution of the court to prevent this local dis-
crimination, to deny to States the power, even in the exercise of
comity to foreign corporations, to give any preference to any per-
son or class of persons on account of citizenship, or even of resi-
dence, and to make the maxim "equality is equity" the pat-amount
law in administering even the local assets of an insolvent foreign
corporation, becomes the more manifest and unmistakable when it
is noted that the Act in question does not in terms give preference
to any citizen of any State. The statute denounced by this opinion
as unconstitutional employs this language:
"Residents of this State shall have a priority in the distribution
of assets, or subjection of the same, or any part thereof, to the pay-
ment of debts over all simple-contract creditors being residents of
2
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any other country or countries ;" while the language of the Consti-
tution is: "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all priv-
ileges and immunities of citizens of the several States."
It was objected in vain that neither the Act nor the decree there-
under denied the plaintiffs any privileges or immunities of citizens
of any State, or of the United States; nor deprived them of property
without due process of law; nor denied them equal protection of
the laws; nor gave any priority or preference to citizens of Tennes-
see; for it did not appear either in the pleadings or the decree that
the creditors preferred were citizens of Tennessee, nor those post-
poned were not citizens of Tennessee. The pleadings showed only
that the creditors preferred were residents of the State, and that the
complaining creditors were rcsidents of Virginia and of Ohio; and
the decree of the State Court was pronounced upon this basis. To
this objection the court replied: "The State did not intend to place
creditors, citizens of other States, upon an equality with creditors,
citizens of Tennessee, and to give priority only to Tennessee credit-
ors over creditors who resided in, but were not citizens of other
States. The manifest purpose was to give to all Tennessee credit-
ors priority over all creditors residing out of that State, whether the
latter were citizens or only residents of some other State or country.
Any other interpretation of the statute would defeat the object for
which it was enacted." And yet the Tennessee Court, construing
the Tennessee statute, had held that residents meant residents and
not citizens, and had made its decree accordingly.
Of course it was not meant by the Supreme Court of the United
States to declare that "citizen" and "resident" are synonymous
terms, and thereby to overrule a long line of its own decisions; nor
probably was it meant to hold that though a State Court has power
to construe the State statute, the Federal Courts will not accept
such previous construction. But it is not plain, notwithstanding the
disclaimers in the opinion, in view of this decision, what will be the
ruling of the Federal Supreme Court upon State statutes contain-
ing the word "resident," construed by the State Court to mean
"resident," if the effect shall be thereby to give prior rights to
citizens of the State over citizens of other States; and this problem is
pregnant with interest in view of the innumerable State statutes in
regard to bonds, exemptions, attachments, insolvent administration,
and the like, which discriminate between residents and non-resi-
dents in the matter of fundamental rights, such as suing and holding
property. Logically, it seems to be a new departure in this branch
of the law.
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It is interesting to note that in this case, while there was a re-
versal of the decree of the State Court as to natural persons, non-
resident of the State, as to foreign corporations of other-States, the
decree was affirmed upon the ground that such artificial persons
were not embraced within the term "citizen" employed in Article
IV of the Federal Constitution; and that they are not, within the
meaning of the XIVth Amendment, "persons within the jurisdic-
tion" of the State of Tennessee; nor by the decree of the State
Court, "deprived of property," without due process of law.
The Colorado case (Fritts v. Palmer, 132 U. S.) was not over-
ruled by the opinion in the Embreeville case; and, therefore, while
citizens of the State of Colorado, by force of its constitution and
statute, have a prior right of satisfaction of all their claims for debts
or other liabilities out of the assets of any insolvent foreign corpora-
tion in that State, even though such assets may have been mort-
gaged to secure a debt created in another State and due to citizens
thereof, residents of Tennessee, under a statute making no discrim-
ination against citizens of other States, but only between residents,
and in respect to foreign corporations, are denied the same right of
prior satisfaction of their debts over even simple-contract creditors
residing in Ohio. What shall be the decision of this question when
the statute of Massachusetts or South Carolina, or Ohio or
Oregon, shall come under judgment, "let time and chance deter-
mine." It is to be confidently expected, of course, that the solution
of the problem will be such that, whatever the reasoning with re-
gard to the similar statutes of these various States, the result will
be that the citizens of each State shall thereafter be entitled to all
the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the other States.
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